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复杂关系 (Relationship Status: It's Complicated) - 1 | May 08, 2008 09:39
上周六的华侨学生集会是一个令人深深不安的经验;有许多比肉眼可见更深入的问题都浮现了。
首先,学生们都摆出了一张给公众看的面孔,倒不太真诚的。他们高呼英文口号:「We Love China, We Love New Zealand」,但集会的宣传单张上却以中文写着:「维护祖国统一」。有人拿着说明政治不应与奥运相提并论的告示牌及T-恤,但却有示威牌写上:「一个国家,一个家庭」 (One Country, One Family) –是非常明确并具很强政治性的讯息:西藏应继续是中国的一部分。学生可能试图以新西兰国旗等淡化火红色的民族主义讯息,但当数以百计的中国人挥舞着巨型中国国旗,开始唱中国国歌,这讯息就已大声清楚了。
(cont.)
复杂关系 (Relationship Status: It's Complicated) - 2 | May 08, 2008 09:34
不难理解,学生要强化了讯息来动员人群,但他们努力把语气淡化下来,显示出他们也理解讯息可造成的一些问题。
这份民族主义的演示表明了他们要优先认同自己的中国国民身份;不只在任何对新西兰的情感之上,而是在更广泛的西方关注之上。没有更强的方式去说:「我不是你的一份子」。更重要的是,推广这种民族主义,令集会变得无谓了。他们的信息是:「我们不关心你所关心的(西藏/人权),但我们希望你关心我们所关心的(中国的威信/领土完整)」。他们不关心世界其他地方的,又如何能期望其他人关心中国呢?
他们缺乏自我意识,这是一个事实:中国民族主义完全只关于中国的福祉。
你要怎说现代美国和法国的虚伪也可,但最少他们对民族的想法,以及表达的方式,跟自由和民主的概念联系在一起;新西兰和澳大利亚的身份则充满着平均主义。而中国的民族主义就完全只顾中国。这当然使得西方关注和怀疑中国的民族主义,而面对人权的挑战时,被中国民族主义包围着的,只能确认那些怀疑。
但现在是西方重新看看中国民族主义的时候。答案非常明显:它是实实在在的。传媒报导示威由中国政府支持或主办的声闻,令事件增添了公信力,这意味着:一)中国政府有足够的控制权,可在一星期内动员600名在惠灵顿和3000名在奥克兰的学生,及;二)中国的民族主义在某程度上是人工制成的,仅存在于政府的指令下。
是的,中国的民族主义是通过学校积极推动的,但每一个民族主义的产生,取决于选择性和自觉性的历史复述,而中国没有什么不同。它教授的历史,叙述中国从前是一伟大的权力,在腐败和内战中被削弱,受到一系列当权殖民国家的屈辱和征服:这叙述以孙中山先生开始,绘画现代中国的一个以加强及保护祖国,远离内部腐败和分裂,以及外国势力干涉的大计划。
这些都不是想像出来的历史怨气-有部分仍是犹新的记忆,而怨气的影响已传接过几代人了。更重要的是,现在这成为了个人关注的事。它是仍以西方文化为主导的世界里赋予力量的来源,也可让中国人了解他们作为强大、正崛起的中国的一部份,在世界上的地位。当越来越多中国人出来融入世界,正如这些国际学生,这事便更重要了。他们虽然年轻,但受过教育并有国际化的体验。他们也是一组平常不会涉及公众示威的人,因此,有这么多人现身支持,就显示他们对此事有多关注。
要求西藏独立,必须先看这方面的历史背景。除了很大机会激起中国民族分裂主义,还有象征的意义是,会把中国的发展大计划推回去旧地。失去西藏是重新分裂及削弱中国,并推而广之,是拒绝中国在过去一个世纪所取得的非凡但昂贵的进展。这正正就是他们这么不高兴的原因。
所以,结论是丑陋和务实的:推动西藏独立是要激起中国的民族主义,这将只会导致任何在西藏实行文化自治的希望被扼杀了。
但同时间,中国-尤其是海外中国留学生-需要深思熟虑,到底他们想如何与西方从事。在一些像上周的集会中唯一发放了的讯息是:「我们很不高兴」。这某程度上可以改变一些行动,但并不能改变人们的意见。可能抒发了他们的不满使这些学生的感觉好一点,但作为中国对外的桥梁,华侨学生应该向往更好的。
(This is a Chinese version of the original post below.)
Relationship Status: It's complicated | May 02, 2008 01:53
The Chinese students' rally last Saturday was a deeply unsettling experience. There was a lot more to it than meets the eye.
For starters, the students were putting on a public face that was less than genuine. They shouted the slogan (in English) "we love China, we love New Zealand", but the flyers promoting the rally read "維護祖國統一", which translates into "Defend the Unity of the Mother-country". While some had signs and t-shirts which said politics should be kept out of the Olympics, others held signs for "One Country, One Family", with the very clear – and very political – message that Tibet should remain a part of China. Not that it really made much difference. The students might have tried to tone down the bright-red nationalism of their message with New Zealand flags and so forth, but when hundreds of Chinese waving giant Chinese flags start singing the Chinese national anthem, the message is anything but ambigious.
It's understandable that the students want to ramp up the message to mobilise a crowd, but their efforts to tone it down also showed some awareness of the problems that their message posed.
The demonstration of nationalism showed that they prioritised their national identity as Chinese first – not just above any kind of attachment to New Zealand, but above the broader concerns that the West was expressing. There is no stronger way to say "I'm not one of you". More importantly, though, the kind of nationalism they are promoting also renders the rally pointless. Their message was that: "We don't care about what you care about (Tibet, human rights), but we want you to care about what we care about (China's prestige and territorial integrity)." How can they expect the rest of the world to care about China when they don't care about the rest of the world?
It's a fact that they lacked self-awareness about: Chinese nationalism is exclusively about the wellbeing of China.
Say what you will about the hypocrisy of USA and France in modern times, but their ideas of nationhood – the way they express nationalism – are tied to concepts of freedom and democracy; New Zealand and Australian identity is infused with egalitarianism. Chinese nationalism, on the other hand, is entirely concerned with China. Of course this makes the West concerned and suspicious about Chinese nationalism, and rallying around Chinese nationalism when confronted with human rights challenges just serves to confirm those suspicions.
But it's time for the West to look at Chinese nationalism anew, too. To state the really bloody obvious, it's real. Coverage of the protests gave much credibility to claims that they were backed or organised by the Chinese government, implying that a) the Chinese government had enough control over the students here in New Zealand that they could mobilise 600 students in Wellington and 3000 in Auckland in the space of a week, and b) that Chinese nationalism is somehow artificial, something that only exists by mandate of the government.
Yes, Chinese nationalism is actively promoted through the schools, but every conception of nationalism depends on a selective and conscious retelling of history, and China's no different. It's taught as a historical narrative of China being once a great power, weakened by corruption and in-fighting, humiliated and subjudicated by a series of colonial powers; this narrative frames modern China from Sun Yat Sen onwards as a project to strengthen and protect China – from internal corruption and fracture, as well as from foreign interference.
These are not imagined historical greviences – part of it is still living memory, and its effects have been passed on through generations. More importantly, it matters to individuals now. It's a source of empowerment in a world that's still culturally dominated by the West, and it's a way for Chinese to understand their place in the world, as part of a powerful, rising China. It's all the more important as Chinese move out into the world – as these international students have. They might be young, but they are also educated and cosmopolitan. They are also a group that's not usually involved in public demonstrations – so the fact that so many turned out showed just how much this matters to them.
Calls for Tibetan independence need to be seen in this historical context. Apart from the very tangible prospect that it would inflame ethnic separatism across China, the symbolic significance is that it would be a roll-back of the China project. To lose Tibet is to refragment and weaken China, and by extension, it's a rejection of the extraordinary but costly gains that China has made over the last century. That's why they're so upset.
So the conclusion is ugly and pragmatic: To push for Tibetan independence is to inflame Chinese nationalism, which will only result in smothering any hopes for cultural autonomy in Tibet.
But at the same time, China – and oversea Chinese students in particular – need to think long and hard about how they want to engage with the West. The only message that rallies like last week's send is: "We are upset." It can change actions, up to a point, but it does nothing to change people's opinions. It might have made those students feel better to voice their sense of grievance, but as China's bridge to the world, the international students should aspire towards better.
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